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Abstract
We present a comparative theory of “Non-Integrated”, “Integrated”, and “Decentralized”
firms, and study the optimal scope of a firm and the assignment of different types of man-
agers to different types of firms, in an IO setting with R&D and production activities. “Non-
integrated firms” fail to take into account the externalities that managers’ decisions have on
other firms. While an “integrated firm” internalizes these externalities, it does not take into
consideration the “private benefits” of managers. The “decentralized firm” works as a hybrid
of these two structures. We also interpret our model from the viewpoint of the allocation of
formal authority, and uncover some interesting economic implications.
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1. Introduction 
1.1. The Importance of Our Research: Real World Examples
We shall start with some anecdotes involving U.S. and Japanese firms that provided the
motivation for this paper1.
In the early1920s, before Alfred Sloan’s reorganization of General Motors, the manufac-
turing managers of Buick, Cadillac, Chevrolet, Oakland, and Oldsmobile operated with suffi-
cient independence, but the coordination among these divisions was inadequate. The plans and
decisions of the independent managers were poorly coordinated by the central office. The sep-
arately formulated product strategies of the units led to more competition among themselves
than with Ford. Failure to coordinate on design standards also prevented the divisions from
taking full advantage of the potential economies of scale when making or purchasing common
components, like sparkplugs and bearings. There was also a failure to coordinate sales and
production. In brief, the former organization of GM was essentially a collection of car compa-
nies and suppliers operating without any centralized coordination. The multidivisional struc-
ture GM implemented resolved these problems because, in addition to its decentralized divi-
sions, it had a central office with a strong, professional staff to plan strategy and coordinate
divisional activities. At GM, each separate division made and sold a car targeted at an
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1 The description of the U.S. cases is based on Milgrom and Roberts (1992).
assigned market segment. Each division had its own managerial team with authority to make
its own operating decisions. Unlike other business organizations, GM’s central office was not
responsible for day-to-day operations. Its primary role was to plan and coordinate overall
strategy. It was also responsible for the coordination of the research and development func-
tions of the corporation, and hosted group meetings to share ideas about how to improve prod-
ucts and reduce the manufacturing costs of each division. In summary, the structure of GM
was changed by the creation of an organization consisting of separate divisions well matched
to a central office that coordinated business strategies. Its great success led others to mimic
GM’s structure and strategy.
Prior to World War I, Sears Roebuck was a highly centralized mail-order catalog business
dealing in “hard goods,” such as tools. After the war, it set up retail stores on the main streets
of U.S. cities and expanded its product line to include “soft goods,” such as clothing. Sears
initially tried to maintain its centralized organization. However, consumer demands varied
widely across the country, such that warm coats that would sell well in the cold northern states
would not in Florida or Texas. If the organization was to respond to local conditions, managers
in the different regional markets needed to be given more authority to run their local opera-
tions. Ultimately, Sears reorganized its business by establishing divisions on a regional basis,
the managers of which had greater decision-making authority. As an example showing similar
motivation, Niihara and Takaoka (2004) pointed out that in the Japanese franchising organiza-
tions that have appeared recently, there is an increasing tendency for the franchisees to be
given more authority to develop their own business models and ideas, instead of just following
the orders of the franchisors. In other words, though many franchising organizations still
remain integrative and centralized, the process of decentralization is certainly under way.
Hoshi and Okazaki (2001) explored the historical factors in the banking industry that
brought about the “Heisei bubble” and its subsequent crash. They pointed out that Japanese
banks (e.g., Sumitomo and Mitsubishi) were rather decentralized in the1970s and 80s. Top
managers delegated formal authority on lending to local (branch) managers. Because the
incentive for promotion inside the banks was too intense, the local (branch) managers with
authority competed fiercely with one another for expansion in their own market and promo-
tion within firms as a reward. This resulted in an oversupply of liquidity, which became an
important factor in the greater damage of the “Heisei bubble” and its crash.
However, there has been a recent and growing trend for big banks to integrate with one
another (e.g., Sumitomo and Sakura). At the same time, since the revision of the commercial
law in 1997, the firm groups, each of which consists of a holding company and business units,
have often been involved in the process of merger and integration. Mizuho Financial Group in
the Japanese banking industry, NTT Group in the telecommunication industry, and JFE
Holdings in the steel industry are representative examples among others. The common feature
is that each business unit is empowered with formal authority, and each unit decides on the
optimal behavior independently having been delegated that authority, which serves to increase
the unit’s initiative. Meanwhile, the top management (professional manager) of the holding
company attempts to govern Nash equilibrium behavior among the business units in the group
from the viewpoint of total profit maximization. This represents the internalization of exter-
nalities by the top management (professional manager).
As an aid to understanding these phenomena, we will provide a comparative theory of
non-integrated, integrated (centralized) and decentralized firms in this paper.
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1.2. Literature and This Paper
Do firm boundaries affect the allocation of resources? What determines where firm
boundaries are drawn? Since the landmark article “The Nature of the Firm” (1937) by Ronald
Coase, these questions have already received much research attention, as mentioned below. In
contrast, we know relatively little about how these boundaries affect firm behavior. Empirical
evidence seems to show that integrated firms do in fact behave quite differently from non-
integrated ones. Also, how the organizational structure of the firm (e.g. decentralization and
authority delegation) affects firm behavior is an important problem, as historical cases show.
How do we formalize this into a model?
In order to understand the essence of these phenomena, we construct a simple, concrete
IO model with R&D and production activities, which is mainly based on the ideas contained
in the “Firm Scope” paper by Hart and Holmstrom (2002).2
The existing literature on firms, based on incomplete contracts and property rights, which
originated with Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990), emphasizes that the
ownership of assets--- and thereby firm boundaries--- is determined in such a way as to
encourage ex-ante relation-specific investments by appropriate parties. Indeed, Hart and
Moore (1990) focuses on ex-ante relation-specific investments, by suppressing ex-post activi-
ties and assuming ex-post reduced form value functions. It is also generally accepted that the
Grossman-Hart-Moore approach is more applicable to owner-manager firms than to large cor-
porations.3
In this paper, we incorporate three important elements, in order to improve the existing
modeling. First, we focus more on “ex-post decisions”. They are non-contractible, but trans-
ferable through ownership. This is similar to the “ex-post decisions” view by Grossman and
Hart (1986), except that they are “contractible” in Grossman and Hart (1986), while they are
“non-contractible” in Hart and Holmstrom (2002) and our model. So our ex-post decisions
must be modeled in a self-enforcing way. Second, managers enjoy private benefits that are
non-transferable. The importance of this idea seems to originate with Aghion and Bolton
(1992). Since this concept of “private benefits” is indeed an important element for analyzing
the problem of how firm boundaries and the organizational structure of the firm (e.g., decen-
tralization and authority delegation) affect firm behaviors, we also incorporate it into this
model. Third, the decisions of managers will depend on their preferences, which in turn may
depend on the scope of the firm they run. The implication of this assumption is that firm
boundaries do matter: a merger between two firms will not be neutral, since the new manager
of the integrated firm will not have, and in general cannot have, the same preferences as the
two previous managers. Rotemberg and Saloner (2000) argued that managers’ preferences
may influence firm performance, by showing that ex ante incentives for profitable innovation
may be enhanced by employing a visionary (enthusiastic) manager whose vision biases him in
favor of certain projects. However, their focus was on within-firm bias. It also limited the
model to incentive considerations and did not study such issues as decision-making or coordi-
nation, as our paper does. Our paper, like Hart and Holmstrom (2002), considers how man-
agerial characteristic such as vision or enthusiasm can be a determinant of firm boundaries
(scope).
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2 Our model considers the Cournot game with R &D investment, which gives good insight into the results, rather than
the coordination game in Hart and Holmstrom (2002). Our model also closely and concretely examines the issue of authori-
ty delegation in the form of decentralized firm.
3 For a critique, see Holmstrom and Roberts (1998).
By employing a concrete IO model with these ingredients, we can study the optimal
scope of a firm, and the assignment of different types of managers to different types of firms
and activities. First, we find that “non-integrated firms” fail to account for the external effects
that their decisions have on other firms, while an “integrated firm” can internalize such exter-
nalities, but it does not take into consideration the private benefits of managers. This is a basic
trade-off between the two organizational forms. Next, we consider a third model, the
“Decentralized Firm”, which can be viewed as an intermediate form between the “non-inte-
gration” and the “integration” regimes. The idea is that certain decisions should be put in the
hands of someone with different preferences from the professional managers in order to create
a balance between the internalization of externality effects and the consideration of private
benefits.
We also see that our framework is closely related with the optimal delegation of formal
authority in organizations. Aghion and Tirole (1997) developed a theory of the optimal alloca-
tion of formal authority (the right to decide) and real authority (effective control over deci-
sions) within organizations. While our paper does not explicitly deal with real authority4, it
analyzes the determinants of the boundary of the firm, i.e., “Integration vs. Non-Integration”.
From the viewpoint of the allocation of formal authority following Aghion and Tirole (1997),
“Integration” or “Centralized Firm” in our paper corresponds to a fully integrated organiza-
tion, in which the professional manager has formal authority over all decisions (production
and R&D). “Non-Integration” corresponds to a fully disintegrated organization, consisting of
two independent units (firms) with formal authority over all decisions. However, it could
cover the situation in which the local managers have formal authority over all decisions within
organizations. That is, it also could be viewed as the full delegation of authority to the lower
tiers of organizations. The “Decentralized Firm” is an intermediate form of the allocation of
formal authority situated between “Integration” and “Non-Integration”, where the professional
manager determines that the R&D activities will be his own responsibility and production
activities are delegated to the local managers (namely, non-delegation of authority on R&D
and delegation of authority on production). We will identify some determinants of the alloca-
tion of formal authority in organizations, similar to Aghion and Tirole (1997).
Thus, we will provide a comparative theory of “Integrated”, “Non-Integrated” and
“Decentralized” firms. We compare the equilibrium incentives in these three second-best
regimes with those in the first-best regime, i.e., the one having joint surplus maximization for
two units. We then clarify in which direction a distortion arises in order to obtain the econom-
ic implications of the three regimes.
2. “Non-Integration”: Regime 1
In this regime, the game is played by a pair of independent firms indexed by i = 1, 2.
Each firm allocates resources for the production of goods and for investment in technological
knowledge. The firms are assumed to have an inverse market demand function defined by;
A Comparative Theory of Non-Integration, Integration, and the Decentralized Firm 
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4 Suzuki (2007) extended the collusion model of Tirole (1986) into a principal-supervisor-two agent hierarchy to
revisit the notion of decentralization and delegation in firms. In doing so, he applied the formal vs. real authority argument
put forward by Aghion and Tirole (1997) to understand the allocation of tasks among agents.
Each firm operates in a market which is represented by an inverse demand function relating
the average price of firm i to its own supply qi and the supply of firm j : qj. The parameter β
is an indicator of complementarity or substitutability between the production activities of the
two firms. A negative β is an indicator of complementary goods, and identifies the degree of
complementarity between the two firms. 
Also, the firms are assumed to have cost reducing innovation with a spillover rate φ
which is given by the following total cost formula5;
Each firm is facing a total cost ci depending on the level of production activity. However, the
marginal cost of production activity is negatively related to both the innovation level of the
firm and the innovation of the other firm. Hence, the cost specification above implies that the
cost structures of different firms producing different goods are interdependent. The effect of
cost reducing technology on the formula above implies that, because of technological exter-
nalities, the prevailing marginal cost in a given firm (unit) depends on its own R&D as well as
the R&D of the other firm, whether they are a direct competitor such as in the case of differ-
entiated product, or a complementary firm (unit). As a consequence, R&D plays a different
role here than in the case of homogeneous products since externalities might benefit the inno-
vating firm by lowering the costs of the complement firm. Indeed, in lowering its own margin-
al costs, a given firm may lower the marginal cost of the other firm, with no direct negative
strategic impact on the firm. The impact of innovation on the cost structure of the firm
depends on the magnitude of the spillover parameter φ. The rate of externality φ measures
the degree of appropriability of the innovation outcome. If φ is close to zero, this corresponds
to situations with a high degree of R&D output appropriability, and consequently a high
incentive to conduct R&D. The other polar case corresponds to situations where φ is close to
one. This is interpreted as a low degree of appropriability and hence a low private incentive to
innovate. For any intermediary value, the environment is characterized by imperfect spillovers. 
Thus, each firm’s strategy consists of the pair composed of an innovation
effort and an amount of production such that where denotes the strategy space of
firm i.
Now, the monetary profit function Ri of firm i depends on the production and R&D
strategies such that 
In addition, we assume that each firm (in particular, its manager) enjoys a “private bene-
fit” from its production activities in the market.6 The benefit is non-monetary and non-trans-
ferable, such as job satisfaction and pride/self esteem generated from producing more. We for-
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5 We incorporate the cost reducing innovation/R&D activity e into the model, because we want to analyze the prob-
lem of “delegation of authority” as well. As the reader will see later, the production decision is delegated to the local man-
agers in the “decentralized firm” regime, while R&D activity e is determined by the professional manager (e.g., the general
office) with a different preference from the local managers.
6 Recent literature incorporates this concept into models. As examples, see Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Hart and
Holmstrom (2002). Also see the survey of the points of these models by Dewatripont (2001). 
mulate this “private benefit” in a simple way such that 
In the “Non-Integration” regime, each firm (or its manager) maximizes the sum of the mon-
etary profit and the private benefit7
This is an important assumption.
The Nash equilibrium for this noncooperative game is a pair of Nash equilibrium strategies
Therefore, a Nash equilibrium of this innovation-production game is a pair of actions 
such that no firm (or its manager) has an incentive to deviate from this choice taking the other 
firm’s choice as given. The Nash equilibrium is a simultaneous maximization of the sum of
the monetary profit and the private benefit for each firm. Simultaneity implies that each firm
has not yet observed the other firm’s R&D and production levels, when choosing its own, and
therefore a firm is assumed to anticipate them correctly. Hence, the Nash equilibrium of the
game must satisfy the following first order conditions,
and
which yield the reaction functions of each firm given by;
and
Under the above conditions, we have the following proposition8;
Proposition1
(A) The unique symmetric Nash equilibrium innovation level and the corresponding unique
symmetric Nash equilibrium production level are, respectively,
(B) We have the comparative statics results on as follows:
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7 Managers, who have an interest in private benefit as well as the firm’s profit, are called “enthusiasts” by Hart and
Holmstrom (2002).
8 For detailed calculations, see Appendix 1.
Interpretation
reveals that the existence of technological externalities has a negative
impact on the innovation effort of each independent firm. That is, the existence of spillovers 
reduces the private incentives to invest in technological knowledge, due to the free rider effect,
as one firm may benefit from the innovation of the other firm.
reveal that the existence of private benefit
w has a positive impact on each firm/unit’s production decision and innovation effort. This occurs 
because the increase of private benefit w increases the marginal benefit of increasing qi,i = 1,
2, i.e., it makes the reaction function of i in qi shift outward. Thus, the equilibrium quantity
level qNI increases with w. This increases the marginal revenue of innovation ei for each
firm/unit, and also increases the equilibrium effort level eNI.
reveals that the increase (decrease) in the demand for the comple-
mentary firm increases (reduces) the innovation efforts of the firm i. In contrast, the increase in 
the demand for a rival firm j (i.e., a substitute firm) decreases the innovation effort of firm i.
Hence, the effect on R&D innovation depends on the nature of inter-firm (unit) relationship
i.e., whether the goods of the firms (units) are complements or substitutes.
3. “Integration” 9: Regime 2
In this regime, the two firms are integrated with each other, and a “professional” manag-
er, who maximizes the joint monetary profits of the two firms (units), runs the integrated
firm. For simplicity, we assume that a new professional manager will be employed from out-
side, meaning that he/she has no linkage with the original firms 1and 2. 
Then, the assumption that the new professional manager maximizes just the joint monetary
profits of the two firms (units) will be justified.10 The important point is that the new manager
does not consider the “private benefits” of the two original firm managers.11 In this game, the
new professional manager decides the joint R&D effort level and separate production levels
that maximize the joint monetary profit as a function of qi , qj and e. The financing of the R&D 
is borne by the two divisions (units) according to a prior sharing rule .
Therefore, .We assume that the professional manager decides a total R&D
level e and orders the execution of half of e to each unit. We also avoid the problem of
enforceability, i.e., each unit just follows the order to execute .12 This corresponds to the
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9 “Integration” corresponds to “Centralization” or the “Centralized Firm” in the anecdotes in the introduction.
10 If the manager of firm 1 becomes the new manager of the integrated firm, he/she will maximize the joint monetary
profits RI plus his/her private benefit .
11 Hence, this is not merely a “cooperative game” between the two firms, in the game theoretical sense. Similarly,
even if the integration under an enthusiastic manager (e.g. the firm 1 manager) is allowed, the first best (defined more pre-
cisely in Section 5) cannot be achieved by itself.
12 A typical enforcement mechanism for the professional manager’s formal authority to really work would be the rep-
etition of the relation between the parties after integration.
situation, where, in centralized organizations, top management and its staff can control the 
operating decisions of their units (divisions) directly.13
The equilibrium for this game is a triplet chosen in such a way that the “profes-
sional manager” maximizes the joint monetary profit. The joint monetary profit function is 
defined according to the following;
which is equivalent to:
and hence
The first order conditions of the joint monetary profit maximization are given by the fol-
lowing system of equations; 
and
which yields the following proposition14;
Proposition2
(A) The cooperative R&D effort and the corresponding aggregate production level are, respec-
tively, 
(B) Comparison between “Non-Integration” and “Integration”; when β ≥ 0 , i.e., there  exists
a competing relationship (substitutability) between the two units, as the degree of private
benefit w becomes greater, and as the spillover rate (the degree of externality) φ becomes
smaller, qNI tends to be greater than (the average production level under “Integration”) 
Proof
When β ≥ 0, a sufficient condition for the above condition is .
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manager) and its staff.
14 For detailed calculations, see Appendix 2.
As can be seen, when the degree of private benefit w becomes greater, and as the spillover rate
(the degree of externality) φ becomes smaller, this inequality tends to be satisfied. That is, qNI
tends to be greater than . This reflects the basic trade-off that lies between “Non-Integration
(consideration of w and ignoring of φ) and Integration (ignoring w and internalization of φ)”
4. “Decentralized Firm” 15: Regime 3
The basic trade-off so far is as follows. In the “Non-Integration” regime, the managers of
the two independent firms do not consider the positive externalities of their R&D efforts, and
thus this will generally lead to underinvestment in R&D, though the ‘private benefit’ effect wq
mitigates this underinvestment effect to some degree. On the other hand, in the “Integration”
regime, a “professional manager” maximizes the sum of the monetary profits, ignoring “pri-
vate benefits”, such as job satisfaction and pride/self esteem of the local managers. This
reduces the joint total surplus. Therefore, there exists a trade-off between the internalization of
externalities and the loss of the private benefits in the comparison of two regimes presented so
far. Therefore, a third model will now be considered. This is the “Decentralized Firm”, which
can be viewed as an intermediate form between the “Non-Integration” and “Integration”
regimes.
As stated by Milgrom and Roberts (1992), historically speaking, the multidivisional firm
(“Decentralized Firm” in our model) emerged in an era when there were only two major alter-
natives: highly centralized organizations (in our model, “Integrated” firms), such as that
which had previously existed at Sears and DuPont, and organizations with almost no control
(i.e., a “too decentralized” form, represented in our model, by “Non-Integrated” firms), such
as the form that existed at GM before the reforms undertaken by Alfred Sloan. The rationale
for the multi-divisional structure (“Decentralized Firm”) in GM was to carry out Sloan’s new
market-segmentation strategy, which also fits our “two market” model. GM then placed prod-
uct and marketing decisions in the hands of divisional managers, i.e., formal authority was
delegated to the lower levels of the organization.
Based on this evidence, we hypothesize that in the “Decentralized Firm” regime, a pro-
fessional manager chooses an R&D effort level with the objective of maximizing the joint
monetary profits16, while the local managers of the two units (divisions) maximize the sum of
their unit’s monetary profit and their own “private benefit”, independently and simultaneously.
They are delegated the formal authority of choosing the production activities. Hence, we can
say that the “Decentralized Firm” is an intermediate allocation form of formal authority, in
that the formal authority on the R&D decision is centralized and the formal authority on the
production decision is (divided and) delegated to the local managers (the lower levels of the
organization). 
Now, let us show how the model works.17 First, each of the local managers of the two
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15 The “Decentralized Firm” regime corresponds to the “M-form structure” as described by Williamson (1985) or the
“Multidivisional form” (Milgrom and Roberts (1992)), though we do not deal with the “information asymmetry” and
“internal capital market “arguments as their models do. Suzuki (2002) examined such problems in a principal-supervisor-
two agent hierarchy. This paper is more interested in the optimal scope of a firm i.e., the determination of “firm boundary”
through the trade-off between the internalization of externalities and the consideration of “private benefit”.
16 This may be said to reflect the idea by Williamson (1985, p. 283) that the “M-form structure” removes the general
office executives, i.e., the professional manager in our model, from partisan involvement in the functional parts and assigns
operating responsibilities to the divisions, and that the general staff, moreover, is supported by an elite staff, independent of
the divisional interests.
units chooses the production level qi in order to maximize the sum of his/her monetary profit
and his/her private benefit, given that the “professional manager” decides the common R&D
level e. So, manager i maximizes with respect to qi , given e and qi ; 
That is, the following first order conditions must be satisfied.
which is equivalent to these set of equations
We restrict our attention to the symmetric equilibrium qi = qj = q
DF , and thus we have;
From the simple calculation, we have;  
This shows that an increase in the professional manager’s effort e unanimously induces
the local managers to produce more q in equilibrium. That is, the local managers’ best
response curve against the professional manager’s effort e is upward sloping (in contrast to the
model of Aghion and Tirole (1997)). 
Next, the “professional manager” maximizes the joint monetary profit with respect to e ,
given that the two local managers choose the symmetric Nash equilibrium production level
qDF. Hence, the professional manager’s objective is to maximize with respect to e given qDF
The first order condition is;
The only economically admissible root is;
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17 Carmichael (1983) considered a model, where the principal also makes a common productive effort and the two
agents compete with each other under tournament or relative performance evaluation. Their efforts are chosen in a self-
enforcing way. It is somewhat similar to our model in its structure and solution, but does not consider the problems of “firm
boundary” and “delegation of authority”.  
This shows that the professional manager also increases her effort e for strategic reasons,
so that the professional manager’s best response curve is also upward sloping. This corre-
sponds to a situation of strategic complementarity.
From (15) and (18), we have the equilibrium production and R&D levels.
Proposition 3
(A) The symmetric Nash equilibrium production level and the corresponding Nash equilibri-
um R&D effort are, respectively,
(B) We have that, for all 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1, w ≥ 0
and
The “Decentralized Firm” internalizes the externality effect of R&D innovation, and so under
the lower production cost, generates the incentive to produce more, due to the private benefits.
Hence, we can say that the “Decentralized Firm” manages the trade-off between externality
and private benefits more successfully than “Non-Integration” does.
(C) Comparison between the “Decentralized Firm” and “Integration”; the condition for 
is as follows.
(C.1) whenβ ≥ 0, i.e., there exists a competing relationship (substitutability) between the two
units, we always have .
(C.2) whenβ ≤ 0 , i.e., when there exists a complementary relation between the two units, as the 
amount of private benefit w becomes greater, and as the spillover rate (the degree of exter-
nality) φ becomes smaller, this inequality tends to be satisfied. In contrast, as w becomes 
smaller, and as the degree of complementarity becomes greater, the incentive to expand
production becomes greater through the internalization of positive externalities of q under 
“Integration”. 
Remark Another way of delegating authority in the “Decentralized firm”
There are two decisions (R&D and production) in our model and each one can be made
by one manager or two. This leads to three leading organizational forms. That is,
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“Integration”, “Non-Integration”, and “Decentralized firms”. We have already studied the for-
mer two organizational forms. In a decentralized firm, one decision is made at headquarters
and the other by local bosses (managers). In the decentralized firm analyzed so far, the R&D
decision e is in the hands of one global boss (professional manager) at headquarters, while the
production decisions qi are in the hands of two local bosses (managers) i = 1, 2. Now, there is
another form of decentralized firm, where the roles of the R&D decision and the production
decisions are reversed. That is, the production decisions are in the hands of one global boss
(professional manager), while the R&D decisions are in the hands of two local bosses (man-
agers). In this case, under our assumption that there are no private benefits from the R&D
activities, the R&D activities will be underprovided in equilibrium, i.e., “too little coordina-
tion”, while the production decisions are internalized by the global boss (professional manag-
er). By a similar simple calculation, we see that equilibrium R&D and production levels are
both smaller than those in “Integration” or “Centralized firm”. Thus we can identify that the
delegation form we considered in Section 4 is not only the “natural”, but also the “optimal”
way to delegate authority in the “Decentralized firm”.
5. “Joint Surplus Maximization” Regime
In this section, we analyze the “Joint Surplus Maximization” regime, which is the first-
best optimum regime for the two units. This is a “bench mark” regime, since no manager
exists whose preference is to maximize the joint surplus of the two units. The manager of each
unit, if he/she becomes a top manager, will maximize the joint monetary profits RI plus his/her 
private benefit . The professional manager, who is employed from
outside and has no linkage with the original units, will maximize only the joint monetary prof
its RI. Thus, no manager exists, whose ‘vision’ is to maximize the joint surplus of the two
units.  That is why the “Joint Surplus Maximization” cannot be implemented in equilibrium.
The joint surplus function is expressed as the total sum of the monetary profit and the 
private benefit, and is given by , which is equivalent to
the following equation;
The first order conditions of the joint surplus maximization are given by;
and
So we have the following results18.
The “first best” R&D innovation effort and the corresponding aggregate production level
are, respectively, 
A Comparative Theory of Non-Integration, Integration, and the Decentralized Firm 
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6. Summary of the Results and Implications
Now, let us summarize the equilibrium outcome under each regime analyzed so far. From
Table 1, we can find the three cases where there is no trade-off between externalities and pri-
vate benefits, or the trade-off can be solved perfectly. These are important from the viewpoint
of the comparison of organizational forms.
Proposition4.1
(A) When φ=β= 0 and w ≥ 0, “Non-integration” with the two firms independent can attain
the joint surplus maximization and is thus first-best optimal. 
(B) When w = 0 and , “Integration” can attain the joint surplus maximization
and is thus first-best optimal. 
(C) Whenβ= 0 and , “Decentralized Firm” can attain the joint surplus maxi-
mization and is thus first-best optimal. 
Proof
(A) When φ=β= 0 and w ≥ 0, we have from Table 1,
Rationale φ=β= 0 means that there are no externalities, since the two units are fully inde-
pendent and separable. Hence, there is no problem in not taking into consideration the inter-
nalization of externalities. Then, it is natural that Non-integration is optimal.19
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19 Though “Decentralized Firm” similarly attains the first best, it is essentially the same as Non-integration, and so
was omitted.
Table 1
(B) When w = 0 and , we have from Table 1,
Rationale w = 0 means that there are no private benefits. Hence, there is no problem associ-
ated with ignoring the private benefits. Then, it is natural that Integration (Centralization) is
optimal.
(C) When β= 0 and , we have from Table 1,
Rationale The professional manager has no concern for private benefits w, and the local
(divisional) managers have no concern for internalization of externalities brought about by
their activities. Now, β= 0 means that there are no externalities about the market demands.
Then, it is optimal to allocate control over cost reducing activities to the professional manager
who internalizes their externalities and production activities qi,i = 1, 2 to the local (divisional)
managers who take into consideration their private benefits w. Intuitively, dividing control dis-
ciplines the professional manager when choosing e, since a higher e induces the local (divi-
sional) managers to increase qi,i = 1, 2 in order to increase their payoffs, which in turn
increases the marginal incentive of the cost reducing activity. This result is interesting,
because it implies the optimality of dividing authority between the two parties with regard to
complementary activities, instead giving full control to either of the two.
Next, we examine the cases where the first-best is basically impossible, due to the trade-
off between externalities φ ,β and private benefits w. We have the following proposition on
the comparison of equilibrium incentives.
Proposition4.2
(A) The comparison of equilibrium production activities between the three regimes depends on
the production structure as captured by the complementarity (substitutability) parametersβ,
the size of the private benefit w, and the magnitude of spillovers φ . Ifβ≥ 0 (substitutable 
goods) and , i.e., when the private benefit w is relatively greater, then
we have . We also have , if and only if β≤ 0 (complementary
goods) and .
(B) We have the results on the comparison of equilibrium R&D innovation between three
regimes. If β > 0 (substitutable goods), R&D innovation e is greater in “Decentralized
Firm” than in “Integration” for all 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1, w ≥ 0, i.e.,eDF > eI. However, if β < 0 (com-
plementary goods), it critically depends on the relative size of the degree of complementari-
ty β and the size of the private benefit w. As w becomes relatively greater, eDF tends to be
greater than eI. In which regime of “Non-Integration” and “Integration” R&D innovation e
is greater depends on the trade-off between the internalization of externality (the rate of
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spillover) φ and the size of the private benefit w. As w (φ ) becomes relatively greater, eNI
(eI ) tends to be greater.
(C) “Integration” brings about under-production and under-innovation results, due to the fact
that no consideration is given to the private benefit w. That is, and eI ≤ eJS for w ≥ 0
and 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1. As for the comparison on incentives between the “Decentralized Firm” and
the First Best, if β ≥ 0 (substitutable goods), then we have qDF ≥ qJS and eDF ≥ eJS, which we
can call the over-production and over-innovation results, and vice versa.
(D) As φ goes to 0, qNI tends to be greater than qJS for β> 0. As β(>0) goes to 0, qJS tends to
be greater than qNI for 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1. Suppose φ= 0 (or small enough). If β> 0 and w = 0, we
have qNI > qJS > qI.
Proof See Appendix 4.
6.1. Implication for Competition Policy: Consumer Beneficial Organization Structure
We consider the implication for competitive policy, focusing on proposition 4.2 (A). The
question is which organizational structure is the most beneficial for consumers.
Case 1: under the condition that β ≥ 0 and corresponds to
the situation where the “decentralized firm” brings about the greatest expansion of production 
between the three organizational forms, through the negative externality of production q
for β ≥ 0 (substitutable goods) and the production expansion brought about by the relative-
ly large private benefit w. In this case, the market prices are ranked as pDF ≤ pNI ≤ pI in equi-
librium. Hence, the “decentralized firm” is the most beneficial for consumers.
Case2:  with β ≤ 0 and corresponds to
the case where the effect of the internalization of the externalities under the “Integration” 
regime is largest. In this case, production expands mainly through both the large reduction
in marginal costs (the internalization of the positive externality of cost reducing activity e)
and the internalization of the positive externality of production q for β ≤ 0. The market
prices are ranked as pI ≤ pDF ≤ pNI in equilibrium. Hence, “Integration” is the most beneficial
for consumers.20
An Interpretation: Why banks moved towards decentralization in the 1970s and 1980s,
and towards centralization in the 1990s
In some Japanese banks, top managers delegated authority to local managers in the 1970s
and 1980s.21 The market condition was β > 0, i.e., substitutable goods and services, and the
size of private benefits w accompanying the market expansion seems to have been relatively
great, in part because the incentive for promotion inside the banks was intense. Under such
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20 This is the same as the multi-product monopoly model with complementary goods, except for the private benefits .
As Tirole (1988) explains, an increase in the production of good i raises the demand for good j, and so the professional
manager (top management) will sell enough of a good, so as to sufficiently raise the demand for another good. This leads to
the lowest market price PI under “Integration”.
21 See Hoshi and Okazaki (2001).
conditions, the local managers with authority competed with one aother for expansion in their
own market. Hence, the two main forces that β > 0 and w was large drove organizations
towards decentralization, which was beneficial also from the viewpoint of consumers (bor-
rowing firms). 
During the 1990s, due to the development of information technology, information sharing
became less costly (easier), i.e., φ became greater. In addition, the size of private benefits w
became relatively smaller, in part because some of the source for private benefits (e.g., job
satisfaction and pride) disappeared under the blockage due to the collapse of the bubble econ-
omy in the 1990s and the subsequent decline of the Japanese economy. In this situation, the
two units tried to integrate with each other, and improve joint profit by internalizing the nega-
tive externalities brought by the substitutable services, i.e., β > 0. Hence, the forces that
made φ greater, w smaller, and β > 0 drove organizations towards centralization
(“Integration”). In this case, the two units were competitors because of the substitutability of
their services. However, through integration, they were given incentives to raise their own
prices (credit interests), thereby eliminating the negative externalities between them. This
might explain the recent tendency of big banks to merge (e.g., Sumitomo and Sakura). A
notable point is that this “integration” is beneficial not for consumers (borrowing firms), but
from the point of view of the aggregate firm (integrated firm). Indeed, the consumers (bor-
rowing firms) that had fallen into bankruptcy increased in number during the decade.  
6.2. “Zero-Sum” Private Benefit Function:
If we assume that the private benefit functions have a “zero-sum” structure, i.e.,
, the joint surplus maximization is equivalent to the joint monetary prof-
its maximization. This is achieved in the “Integration”, i.e., “Centralization” regime. Hence,
the “Integration” regime is the (first-best) optimal, and we point out the following.
Corollary
If the private benefits are distributed unequally, such as in the “Zero-Sum” structure,
, “Integration” or “Centralization” is optimal.
6.3. The Possibility of Enforceable Contract between Two Local (Divisional) Managers
in a Decentralized Firm.
Suppose that an enforceable contract is possible between two local (divisional) managers
in a Decentralized firm. We have the following proposition.
Proposition5
If an enforceable contract is possible between two local (divisional) managers, it is opti-
mal to delegate the authorities of production activities to them, thereby letting them choose
production activities cooperatively, expecting the professional manager’s choice of R&D
effort. 
The proof is relegated to Appendix 5. The argument is as follows. Given that the profes-
sional manager chooses R&D activity e, two local (divisional) managers cooperatively choose
production activities qi,i = 1, 2 so as to maximize their joint surplus. Similarly, given the two
local (divisional) managers’ cooperative behavior, the professional manager chooses R&D
activity e so as to maximize the monetary total profit. Then, production activities qi,i = 1, 2
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and R&D activity e are chosen so as to fully internalize externalities by the union of two local
managers and the professional manager, respectively. Hence, the first best allocation is
achieved in a Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative game between the union of two local
managers and the professional manager. 
This is an interesting theoretical remark, but, since any enforceable contract is impossible
between two local (divisional) managers and actions must be chosen in a self-enforcing way,
this solution is impossible.
7. Two Remarks on the Analysis of the Paper
Thus far we have emphasized the interpretation where the private benefits wi are enjoyed
by a single manager in each unit, who is the boss under non-integration and a subordinate
under integration. The interpretation that private benefits are enjoyed by a single manager is
restrictive in that it implies that the units are in effect sole proprietorships under non-integra-
tion. However, there is a second interpretation of the model, and it is worth mentioning the
interpretation that applies to the case where the units are large companies. We can imagine
that the private benefits refer to the job satisfaction of unit i workers rather than the private
benefits of a single manager, and that some bosses have goals that are (partially) congruent
with those of the workers, i.e., they care about the same things. In particular, suppose that
there are three types of bosses, a unit 1 enthusiast with preference m +λ1 w1 , a unit 2 enthusi-
ast with preference m +λ2 w2 , and a professional manager with preference m, where m is
money and λ1 ,λ2 represent congruence between a boss’s goals and those of unit 1 and 2
workers. In our model’s terminology, a unit i enthusiast will maximize Ri +λi wi , while a pro-
fessional manager will maximize R = R1 + R2. Monetary profit can be diverted by the bosses.
Then, if we make the simplifying assumption that λ1 = λ2 = 1, this yields the same objective
functions for the different kinds of bosses as the model without workers analyzed so far.
In this interpretation, the choice of organizational form is made by the initial owners of
units 1 and 2 at the beginning of the period. They must decide whether the units should be
separate (non-integration), together (integration) or its intermediate form (delegation or the
decentralized firm), and what kind of boss to be placed in charge. Assume that owners face a
competitive labor market and wages are agreed upon up front. Then, the total wage ωi for unit
i workers will satisfy ωi + wi = U, where U is the (total) market clearing reservation wage (a
constant), and wi refers to (expected) worker private benefits. Suppose that the initial owners
wish to sell and retire, i.e., they are interested only in money. Then, given that side-payments
are possible, organizational form will be selected by the owners to maximize the total value of
the two units, net of the wages. From the above argument, maximizing total profits net of
worker wages is equivalent to maximizing total profits plus worker private benefits, i.e. R1 +
R2 + w1 + w2 . Thus, we can justify having the private benefits wi,i = 1, 2 included
in the welfare calculations that are used to determine which of three organizational forms is
most efficient and can attain the most efficient corporate governance.
The conclusion is that the parties will choose an organizational form at date 0 that maxi-
mizes net total surplus, subject to the equilibrium behavior of the managers (bosses), and that
our formulation and analysis is consistent with the standard assumption by economists that
owners are optimizing the organizational structure.
The second remark is on incentive schemes. Fortunately, another feature of λi = 1,i = 1,
2 is that it can avoid the need to consider incentive schemes. Clearly there is no role for an
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incentive scheme based on unit i profit, in the case of a unit i enthusiast (narrow boss), since
such a boss has the “right” preferences for his/her unit (total profit plus worker private bene-
fits, i.e., total surplus). An incentive scheme only makes things worse in the case of a profes-
sional manager, since he/she already cares too much about profit. 
It might be desirable to reward unit i ’s boss according to unit j ’s profits in order to
encourage coordination. Note, however, that this will not “solve” the coordination problem
unless unit j ’s workers’ private benefits can also be made part of this incentive scheme (which
is impossible, because these benefits are not verifiable). Anyway, it is an important point that
our argument essentially assumes a world with incomplete contracts.
8. Conclusion
In this paper, a two-unit model of production and R&D innovation is presented. The
model presented is similar to the traditional view of the firm as a technologically defined enti-
ty that makes decisions about inputs, outputs, and investments. Holmstrom and Roberts
(1998) pointed out the importance of viewing a firm as an entity of “units and activities”, as
well as considering “asset ownership”: the core of the property right theory as defined by
Grossman-Hart-Moore. 
Based on the idea of Hart and Holmstrom (2002), which formalizes the view of the firm
as an entity of “units and activities”, but by employing a concrete IO setting (Cournot game
with R &D investment, different from the coordination game in Hart and Holmstrom (2002)),
we studied the optimal scope of a firm, and the assignment of different types of managers to
different types of firms and activities.22 We find that non-integrated firms fail to account for
the external effects that managers’ decisions (R&D and production decisions) have on other
units. An integrated firm can internalize such externalities, but it does not take into considera-
tion the private benefits of the local managers. So, in order to create a balance between the
internalization of externality effects and the consideration of the private benefits, we consider
a third model, the “Decentralized Firm”, which is an intermediate form between the “Non-
Integration” and “Integration” regimes. It means that production decisions are put in the hands
of the local managers, who have different preferences from the professional manager, who
takes charge of R&D decision-making. 
From the viewpoint of the allocation of formal authority in the manner described by
Aghion and Tirole (1997), “Non-Integration” corresponds to a fully disintegrated organiza-
tion, consisting of two independent units (firms) with formal authority over all decisions (pro-
duction and R&D), though it can also cover the situation where each of the local managers has
formal authority over all decisions (production and R&D) within firms. “Integration” or
“Centralized Firm” corresponds to a fully integrated organization, in which the professional
manager has formal authority over all decisions (production and R&D). The “Decentralized
Firm” is an intermediate form of allocation of formal authority situated between “Integration”
and “Non-Integration”, where the professional manager determines that R&D activities will
be his own responsibility and production activities are delegated to the local managers (name-
ly, non-delegation of formal authority on R&D and delegation of formal authority on produc-
tion). We attempted to identify some determinants of the optimal allocation of formal authori-
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22 Our model could give good insight into the results, rather than Hart and Holmstrom (2002).We also closely and
concretely examined the issue of authority delegation in the form of Decentralized firm.
ty, similar to Aghion and Tirole (1997). 
We compared these three regimes (organizational forms or allocation forms of formal
authority) mainly from the viewpoint of “marginal incentives”, and obtained some interesting
economic implications. Thus, we provided a comparative theory of “Integrated”, “Non-
Integrated” and “Decentralized” firms. 
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1 Derivation of the Equilibrium Outcome of the “Non-Integration’ Regime
In the “Non-Integration” regime, each firm (its manager) maximizes the sum of the mon-
etary profit and the private benefit. It depends on the output strategies and the innovation
strategies of each firm (manager);
Substituting the inverse market demand of firm i into equation (1), we have;
The Nash equilibrium of this game must satisfy the following first order conditions;
and
which is equivalent to these set of equations;
and
The only economically admissible solution of equation (4.2) is;
Substituting the value of qi and qj from (5) into (4.1)’ yields;
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We have the following equation set;
From (7) we have the reaction function of each player, given by the following relationship; 
By solving the system of equations (8), we have the symmetric equilibrium innovation with
spillover rate φ ; 
The corresponding unique symmetric Nash equilibrium production is;
Appendix.2; Derivation of the Equilibrium Outcome of “Integration” Regime
The joint monetary profit function is expressed as a function of qi and qj and e, and is given by; 
which is equivalent to the following equation; 
The first order conditions of the joint monetary profit maximization are given by;
and
yielding the following set of equations;
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and;
These equations reflect the “internalization of externalities” by qi,i = 1, 2 and e.
Symmetric equilibrium solutions imply 
and;
The only economically admissible solution of (15.2) has;
Substituting (16) into (15.1), we have;
which yields the following innovation level, decided by the “professional manager”; 
The corresponding aggregate production level is;
Appendix 3: Derivation of the Equilibrium Outcome of “Joint Surplus Maximization”
Regime 
The joint surplus function is expressed as the total sum of the monetary profit function and
the private benefit one, and is given by; 
which is equivalent to the following equation;
The first order conditions of the joint surplus maximization are given by;
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and
yielding the following set of equations;
and
These equations reflect the “internalization of externalities” by qi,i = 1, 2 and e.
Symmetric equilibrium solutions imply 
and;
The only economically admissible solution of (24.2) has;
Substituting (25) into (24.1), we have 
which yields the following innovation level, decided by the “professional manager”; 
The corresponding aggregate production level is;
Appendix 4: Proof of Proposition 4.2
(A) The comparison of productions between “Non-Integration” and “Integration” is;
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When β ≥ 0, a sufficient condition for the above condition is . 
We also know that for all 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1, w ≥ 0
Hence, if β ≥ 0 and , then we have . 
Next, we consider the β ≤ 0 case. The comparison of productions is;
and
Then, we find that;
Therefore, we always have , when holds. Further we already have qDF ≥ qNI.
Hence, we have qNI ≤ qDF ≤ . And the condition tends to be satisfied as w is 
smaller, and as φ is close to 1.
(B) From the result of the table, we find that the ratios between eI and eDF are equal to
If β > 0 (substitutable goods), we immediately have that , i.e., R&D innovation eDF
in “Decentralized Firm” is greater than the one eI in “Integration”. However, if β < 0 (com-
plementary goods), it critically depends on the relative size of the degree of complementarity
β and the size of the private benefit w. As w is relatively greater, eDF tends to be greater than
eI. We also have 
So, the question on whether Integration increases R&D innovation more than Non-Integration
depends on the trade-off between the internalization of externality (the rate of technological
spillover) φ and the size of the private benefit w.
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(C) The result that and eI ≤ ejs for w ≥ 0 and 0≤ φ ≤ 1 is obvious from the table. The
intuition is that in the joint surplus maximization regime the effect of the private benefit  is
internalized, while in the “Integration” regime it is ignored.
From the result of the table, we also find that the ratios between qDF and qJS, and between eDF
and eJS are equal to
Since β ≥ 0 indicates that the goods of the two units are substitutable, this can be easily
understood based on a comparison between the Cournot-Nash behavior (in the ‘Decentralized
Firm’ regime) and the internalization of externalities brought about by the productive activi-
ties (in the ‘Joint Surplus Maximization’ regime). The reasoning is similar for β ≤ 0 (comple-
mentary goods case). 
(D) This is due to the fact that
The intuition is that in the joint surplus maximization regime, the externality effect of produc-
tion q is internalized, while it is not considered in the “Non-Integration” regime. It brings
about a direction towards more output expansion in the “Non-Integration” regime whenβ > 0.
But, the spillover effect φ is internalized only in the joint surplus maximization regime. This
leads to more output expansion through greater cost reductions. Next, when φ= 0 , we have
This gives the above result. comes from the internalization of the negative externali-
ty on production q, and is due to the fact that in the “Integration” regime private ben-
efits are ignored by the top manager. 
Appendix 5: Proof of Proposition 5
Suppose that an enforceable contract is possible between two local (divisional) managers. Now
consider delegating the authorities of production activities to them, thereby letting them choose
production activities cooperatively. Given that the professional manager chooses R&D activity
e, two local (divisional) managers cooperatively maximize the joint surplus function 
Given that two local (divisional) managers cooperatively maximize the joint surplus, the pro-
fessional manager chooses R&D activity e in order to maximize the monetary total profit RI.
The first order conditions are given by;
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We have;  
And
These equations reflect the “internalization of externalities” by qi,i = 1, 2 (cooperatively cho-
sen by two local managers) and e (chosen by professional manager).
At symmetric solutions, we have from the first equations,
This is the optimal reaction function by the cooperative two local managers against the R&D
activity e.
The only economically admissible solution of the second first order condition is ,
which is the optimal reaction function by the professional manager against the cooperative
production activities q. From the simple calculation, we see that the first best allocation can be
implemented as a Nash equilibrium in a non-cooperative game between the union of two local
managers and the professional manager).
This is an interesting theoretical remark, but, since any enforceable contract is impossible
between two local (divisional) managers and actions must be chosen in a self-enforcing way,
this solution is impossible.
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